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In this paper we address the issue of how uncertainty could aﬀect the choice
between a federal monetary policy based on national data and one on area-wide
aggregated data in a monetary union with asymmetry in the transmission of
monetary policy. We ﬁnd that the uncertainty about the transmission process
increases the need to take into account information about national economies
in the formulation of optimal monetary policies whereas the introduction of
imperfect forecasts (and, thereby, of additive uncertainty) implies a trade-oﬀ
between the relative accuracy of the (aggregated versus national) forecast and
the asymmetry in the transmission of monetary policy. Under both cases how-
ever, a national based monetary policy is likely to be preferred compared to a
strategy relying uniquely on Union-wide aggregates.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The conduct of monetary policy in Euroland is made diﬃcult because of the
existence of asymmetries within the union. Asymmetries exist both at the level
of the macroeconomic shocks to which members of the union are subjected and
at the level of the transmission of monetary policies. Recent theoretical analysis
has shown that the existence of asymmetries in the transmission of monetary
policy actions of the ECB calls for a design of monetary policies that takes into
account national data. Thus, in order for monetary policies to be set optimally
it is not suﬃcient to use area-wide (euro) data on inﬂation and output gaps,
but also to consider non-aggregated national data on these same variables if
asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policies exist (see De Grauwe
(2000) and Gros and Hefeker (2002)). Empirical evidence seems to support this
view in the case of the Federal Reserve System of Central Banks in the United
States (see Meade and Sheets (2002), and Heinemann and H¨ ufner (2002)).
The previous conclusion has been derived in the context of models in which
there is no uncertainty surrounding the design of monetary policy. The issue
that arises here is whether this conclusion continues to hold when uncertainty
about the transmission process exists (multiplicative uncertainty) or when the
policymaker has to decide upon the monetary policy on the basis of forecasts
which reﬂect an imperfect knowledge of the shocks which may hit the economies
(additive uncertainty).
Monetary policy transmission uncertainty is an important issue in the Euro-
pean context. According to several economists (see, among others, Dornbusch,
Favero and Giavazzi (1998), Mihov (2001) and ECB (2001)), the creation of
EMU is likely to have strengthened the degree of uncertainty surrounding the
transmission of monetary policy measures within the Union.
The optimal design of monetary policy when transmission uncertainty ex-
ists has been analysed in detail in the theoretical literature. The main insight
provided by this literature is that transmission uncertainty may call for more
caution from the monetary authorities. Faced with this kind of uncertainty, the
authorities will tend to stabilize less that when no such uncertainty exists (see
Brainard (1967) for the original argument and S¨ oderstr¨ om (1999) and Peersman
and Smets (1999) for an application to the European context)1.
Regarding the use of forecasts in the implementation of monetary policy in
EMU, several articles have emphasized the role played by the former in the
Central Bank transparency issue (see Cuckierman (2001) or Svensson (1999)),
especially for the ECB. But few address whether the national or Union-wide
based content of such forecasts could impinge on the stabilisation properties of
monetary policy in a monetary union, Some empirical studies (see, e.g., Massi-
miliano et alii (2003)) have shown that such a diﬀerence could matter however,
1Empirical evidence on the caution principle is more ambiguous (see European Central
Bank (2001)).
2by inﬂuencing the predictive power of the forecast at the Union level. Combin-
ing aggregation and uncertainty issues at a theoretical level may thus prove to
be instructive in this respect and take advantage of this empirical evidence.
In this paper, we develop a model of a monetary union in which the trans-
mission of policy induced changes in the interest rate is asymmetric. We do this
when there is no uncertainty surrounding the design of monetary policy. Then
we ﬁrst extend the model allowing for uncertainty in the transmission process.
In a second time, we address the issue of additive uncertainty by introducing
forecast-based monetary policies. Under both cases, we are thus able to analyse
how the uncertainty and asymmetry issues interact and how this interaction
m a yi m p i n g eo nt h ec h o i c eo fam o n e t a r ys t r a t e g yi nE M U
2 National aggregation versus Union-wide aggre-
gates : how to deal with transmission hetero-
geneity?
2.1 The modelling framework
We use a standard macroeconomic model and apply it to a monetary union
framework. The asymmetry is introduced in the model by considering that the
features of the national Phillips curves diﬀer from one country to the other, so
that:
Ui = U∗
i − ai · (πi − πe
i)+εi
i is the country i =1 ,2,...,N
Ui is the unemployment rate in the country i and U∗
i is its natural counter-
part. ai denotes the transmission parameter of (unexpected) inﬂation impulses
to the unemployment gap. As our objective is to analyse the implications of
asymmetries in transmission, we assume that this coeﬃcient diﬀers across coun-
tries.
We will not assume asymmetry in the shocks. This has been done elsewhere
(see De Grauwe (2000)). We focus on the asymmetries in the transmission pro-
cess because this is where the uncertainty will arise (see infra). Thus, we suppose
that εi = ε for all i. Put diﬀerently, we intend to analyse a world of symmetric
shocks that are transmitted asymmetrically.
πi refers to the inﬂation rate of country i. It will be assumed that when the
countries in the model form a monetary union the inﬂation rate is the same in
all countries. We have two reasons to do this. First, as it is usually the case
in the literature, we suppose that the monetary authorities directly control the
inﬂation rate. Second, as monetary policy is determined in a centralised fashion
3when a monetary union exists, the member countries share common monetary
conditions in the Union, which should lead to the same rates of inﬂation. There
is of course evidence indicating that inﬂation rates in the eurozone diﬀer across
countries. However, it is likely that those inﬂation diﬀerentials are very much
inﬂuenced by the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect. Since this is primarily a structural
feature, it should not be very much inﬂuenced by monetary policy.
The single monetary policy in a monetary union can be designed in two
ways.
1- First, the common (federal) Central Bank may choose to minimise a
weighted average of national loss functions. We deﬁne this strategy as a na-
tional aggregation (NA) procedure. The national loss function depends on
the squared deviations of inﬂation and output from target levels in the following
way:
Li ≡ (πi)
2 + b · (Ui − U∗
i )
2
where b denotes the relative weight of the unemployment gap with respect
to inﬂation in the loss function. Note that for the sake of convenience we set
the target rate of inﬂation equal to 0. In addition, we assume that the unem-
ployment target of the authorities coincides with the natural unemployment.
As a result, we disregard issues relating to credibility. Indeed, we want to em-
phasize that the monetary authorities are likely to face the heterogeneity in the
transmission of monetary policy, regardless of their potential time-inconsistency.
In the (NA) scenario therefore, the central bank of the monetary union
determines its optimal strategy by minimising the “average” of the loss functions





µi is the weight associated to country i in the computation of the aggregate
loss function. We have:
Pi=N
i=1 µi =1 .
As the inﬂation rate is common to all the member countries, we may rewrite
the former expression as:
ΛNA(π)=( π)
2 + b ·
i=N X
i=1
µi · (Ui − U∗
i )
2 (1)
Since (Ui − U∗
i ) depends on the (rationally) unexpected component of the
(common) inﬂation rate, ΛNA will be a function of π (for a given value of the
2By convention, XNA
i (resp. XEA
i ) will refer in the following to the value taken by the
(endogenous) variable Xi when the so-called national-aggregation (resp. euro-aggregation)
strategy is implemented by the Central Bank.
4shock, ε). In the following, we deﬁne πNA as the optimal inﬂation rate under
the NA strategy (i.e. the one for which ΛNA is minimal).
2- The second scenario refers to a strategy where the Central Bank mini-
mizes a loss function deﬁned in terms of Union-wide aggregate variables, i.e. an
average inﬂation rate and an average unemployment rate. As we implicitly refer
to the EMU case, we designate such a strategy as a euro-aggregation (EA)














µi · πi = π
where the subscript E refers to a variable deﬁned at the Union level.
The relevant loss function may then be deﬁned as follows:
ΛEA ≡ (π)












Because of the linearity of the national Phillips relationships, the aggrega-
tion rule allows for the existence of a Union-wide Phillips “curve” between the
aggregate inﬂation rate and the “mean” unemployment gap. Thus we have
UE = U∗
E − aE · (π − πe)+ε
with aE ≡
PN
1 µi · ai, which could be qualiﬁed as the mean transmission
parameter.
Again we observe that ΛEA is a function of π. In the following we deﬁne
πEA as the optimal inﬂation rate under the EA strategy (i.e. the one for which
ΛEA is minimal).
Finally, both strategies have to be compared using a common welfare mea-
sure. As we consider an explicit heterogeneity in the transmission mechanisms,
the benchmark used is the weighted average of the ex ante (expected) national








where Eε is the expectation operator taken with respect to the distribution








52.2 Comparison of the strategies
We now examine the properties of the two strategies in more detail.
1- Under the ﬁrst scenario, the Central bank determines πNA such that it
minimises ΛNA subject to the constraint of national Phillips “curves” prevailing
in the member countries while taking as given the value of the shock (ε)a n d
the private sector’s expectations of the inﬂation rate implemented under this
strategy (πe). Thus, we have






i − ai · (π − πe,)+ε, for i =1 ,2,...,N
Solving this program (including the computation of the rational expected




















1 µi · (ai − aE)
2 which is a
measure of the dispersion in the national transmission parameters. Thus, θ2
aE







1 µi · a2
i.
We observe that when the asymmetry in the transmission process increases,
the authorities’ optimal inﬂation rate reacts less to shocks. The counterpart
of this lessening in the inﬂation variability may be an increasing volatility of
the national unemployment rate with the size in the transmission asymmetry3.
This is seen from the following expression of the equilibrium unemployment rate
(obtained by substituting the optimal inﬂation rate in the Phillips curve):
UNA
i = U∗
i +( 1− ΩNA· ai) · ε
2- Under the second scenario, the Central Bank minimises the loss function
based on the Union-wide unemployment and inﬂation rates. The constraint is
then given by the Union-wide Phillips relationship. We obtain:
3It is important to note that this trade-oﬀ does not necessarily prevail however. A suﬃcient
condition to ensure its existence would be that the sensitivity of the unemployment gap to
monetary policy in the country considered has to be smaller than the one which can be
contemplated at the Union-wide level, that is ai <a E.



















Note that this is the same optimal inﬂation rate which would be obtained if
the model had been applied to the case of a single country (whose role is played
in our framework by the monetary union).
As in the ﬁrst scenario the equilibrium level of the national unemployment




i +( 1− ΩEA · ai) · ε
From these results we conclude that under a strategy which aims at minimis-
ing the variability of Union-wide variables, the asymmetry in the transmission
of the common supply shocks does not act as a motive for changing the inﬂa-
tion rate and, thereby, for aﬀecting the variability of the national unemployment
rates.
A welfare comparison of both strategies goes through the computation of
the weighted average of expected national losses after having substituted the




2 + b ·
i=N X
i=1








2 + b ·
i=N X
i=1





7The relative beneﬁts of a national aggregation strategy versus aU n i o n - w i d e













(1 − ΩEA · ai)












+2· b · aE · [(ΩNA) − (ΩEA)] (6)
Simplifying this expression4 leads to:
∆W ≡ [(ΩEA) − (ΩNA)] · ΩEA · b · θ2
aE (7)
which is positive as ΩEA > ΩNA.
Thus adopting a national aggregation perspective is better than relying on
a Union-wide strategy.
The comparison of the two loss functions may enlight the reasons why the
NA strategy has to be favored5.
Let deﬁne the national unemployment gap, U
g
i ,a s :U
g
i ≡ Ui − U∗
i . Manipu-























2,w h i c hc a nb ec o n s i d e r e da sam e a s u r e
of the dispersion between the national unemployment rates. At equilibrium,
this component depends on the inﬂation rate which is chosen, thus θ2
Ug may be
written as a function of π, θ2
Ug ≡ θ2
Ug (π).
Deriving this expression leads to two interesting and interrelated properties:
• First, we observe that the two strategies are equivalent if and only if there






is no output goal in the loss function of the monetary authorities (b =0 ) .
• Second, given the framework we have retained, there is only one strat-
egy which would satisfy the welfare maximising criteria we have imposed






4On this point, it seems that Gros and Hefeker (2002, p.10) have (mistakenly?) obtained
conditions which are superﬂuous with respect to the result they derive.
5See Annex A for further results on this comparison.











83 Introducing parameter transmission uncer-
tainty in an heterogeneous monetary union
In the foregoing, we have shown that adopting a national aggregation perspec-
tive is unambiguously a better strategy to deal with asymmetries in the trans-
mission mechanisms than to rely on Union-wide aggregates. The question that
arises now is whether this conclusion is maintained when we introduce uncer-
tainty about the transmission mechanisms.
3.1 Uncertainty at diﬀerent levels of aggregation
The latter question is addressed in the model in the following way. Let suppose
that the creation of the monetary Union modiﬁes the Phillips relationship be-
tween national variables so that the coeﬃcient ai c a nn om o r eb ek n o w nw i t h
certainty by the authorities in charge of the common monetary policy but must
be considered as a random variable.
In order to account for this change in regime and to distinguish from non-
random variables in the model, we redeﬁne the national Phillips curve slope
parameter of country i as e ai:
Ui = U∗
i − e ai · (π − πe)+ε (9)
We thus obtain N random variables which, to simplify the analysis, we sup-
pose to be identically and independently distributed with:
Ea (e ai)=ai, ∀i =1 ,...,N
cova (e ai,e aj)=
½
0i f i 6= j
σ2
a if i = j i,j =1 ,...,N
where the subscript a refers to the common (marginal) distribution law of
the system of the N random variables7. Furthermore we suppose that e ai and ε
are not correlated (for all i)
By applying the aggregation rule on the transmission parameters, we are
able to characterise the statistical properties of the Union-wide transmission
coeﬃcient (which thereby becomes a random variable), e aE ≡
PN
1 µi·e ai. Indeed,
we obtain8:
Ea (e aE)=aE
7Assuming that the covariances between the e ai w o u l dn o tb ee q u a lt oz e r o( a n dt h u s
that some of the transmission mechanisms would be linked), would not change the results
qualitatively. See why in Annex B.
8It is interesting to note thus that, in such a model, it is not possible to introduce parameter
uncertainty at the Union level without taking it into account at the national level. Such an
assumption would violate the aggregation principle. It would be possible to consider this
distinction if the Phillips relationships were not linear. But in this case, solutions would be











Finally, the welfare criterium has to be adjusted to take the presence of
uncertainty into account: it is thus based on the expectation of a weighted
average of the national loss functions, with respect to both the distribution of
the error term and the random coeﬃcient (which we assume to be independent).
Thus we use in the following, f W ≡ Eε,a
hPi=N
i=1 µi · Li
i
.
1- Let look, ﬁrst, at the Union-wide strategy (euro-aggregation). In an
uncertain setting, the Central Bank considers the expected value of the loss
function deﬁned in terms of the Union-wide variables with respect to the distri-
bution of e aE.T h i sr e ﬂects the assumption that the authorities manage optimally
the uncertain eﬀects of the policy they intend to design. Thus, the monetary






subject to the constraint:
UE = U∗
E −e aE · (π − πe)+ε
and πe and ε taken as given.







= e ΩEA · ε






To ﬁnd out the value of the unemployment gap prevailing in country i, we
have to substitute for the equilibrium values of π and πe in the random, national





1 − e ΩEA · e ai
´
· ε
After the relevant substitutions, the expected value of the welfare loss func-


















2- We now analyse the national aggregation strategy in an uncertain context.
In this framework, the Central Bank takes uncertainty into account by consid-
ering the expected value of the weighted average of the national loss functions
with respect to the common distribution law of the e ai. Thus, the monetary






subject to the constraint of the N national (“random”) Phillips relationships:
Ui = U∗
i − e ai · (π − πe)+εi =1 ,2,...,N
and πe and ε taken as given.








= e ΩNA· ε






































Whatever the strategy followed by the common central bank (euro or na-
tional aggregation), the introduction of uncertainty in the model has two eﬀects.
11• First, the uncertainty in the transmission process (measured by σ2
a) has an
ambiguous eﬀect on welfare (either considered from the viewpoint of f WNA
or f WEA). On the one hand, it increases welfare through the presence of
the term bσ2
a in the loss function. On the other hand it aﬀects welfare
negatively because e ΩEA (or e ΩNA) depends negatively on σ2
a.T h u s , t h e
net impact of transmission uncertainty on welfare depends on the relative
strength of these two eﬀects. This result is in accordance with the liter-
ature (see Letterie (1997)) and allows for looking at the optimal level of
uncertainty with respect to welfare.
• We also ﬁnd that e ΩEA < ΩEA and e ΩNA < ΩNA. This means that in the
case of transmission uncertainty the optimal inﬂation rate is less sensitive
to shocks than in the absence of uncertainty. This reﬂects the so-called
brainardian principle according to which the monetary authorities refrain
from counteracting shocks too much if they know that such an interven-
tion will add to the variability in the economy (instrumental variability)
because of its random eﬀectiveness. This smoothing eﬀect prevails in the
model, whatever the strategy followed by the monetary authorities.
3.2 Does parameter uncertainty reinforce the case for a
national perspective?
We are now ready to assess how the presence of uncertainty may impinge on
the choice between the two strategies we have envisaged so far.
1- We ﬁrst compare how transmission uncertainty aﬀects the optimal inﬂa-
tion rate under the two strategies.
Our main ﬁnding is that transmission uncertainty has a stronger impact on














. This diﬀerential eﬀect results
from the fact that σ2
a ≥ σ2




As a consequence, when uncertainty prevails, the impact of a shock on the
optimal inﬂation rate is reduced more when the authorities follow a national
aggregation procedure than when they use euro-aggregation (relative to the no
uncertainty case). Thus transmission uncertainty makes the central bank more
cautious under national than under euro aggregation. This result prevails even
if the random national Phillips slope parameters are correlated (see Annex B).
This diﬀerential impact of uncertainty on the inﬂation rate can be explained
as follows. When using the inﬂation rate as a stabilisation weapon, the monetary
authorities know that they will add to the variability in the economy (besides the
12one implied by the supply shock) and thus try to counteract the consequences
of this additional noise on the economy under both strategies. This leads them
to react cautiously to the supply shock in terms of the inﬂation rate (that is
less than when no uncertainty prevails). However the size of this instrumental
variability will be higher when evaluated at the national level rather than at the
Union level (because of the smoothing eﬀect implied by the aggregation rule9).
Therefore the lessening in the inﬂation rate will be larger under the NA strategy
than under the EA procedure.
Those diﬀerent results concerning the inﬂation rate may be summarized by
the following inequality chain (for a positive value of the common shock):
e πNA <
¡
e πEA <? > πNA¢
< πEA
2- Second we compare the welfare losses associated with the two strategies.
Again, this comparison favors the national aggregation procedure.




f WEA − f WNA
´



























































Compared to the certainty case (see equation (7)) the impact of uncertainty
on the welfare loss operates at two levels:
• On the one hand, it aﬀects the value of the reaction coeﬃcient (e ΩNA and








> (ΩEA)−(ΩNA). This impact
arises from two combined channels. First, there is the lessening eﬀect on
9The uncertainty (and thus the instrumental variability) concerns the transmission of in-
ﬂation impulses on the unemployment rate
13the inﬂation rate under both strategies which reﬂects the cautious attitude
of the monetary authorities faced with transmission uncertainty. Second,
there is the smoothing eﬀect of the aggregation rule when the monetary
authorities take instrumental variability into account. The former implies
t h a tt h ep r e s e n c eo fu n c e r t a i n t ya c t sm o r eo nt h ei n ﬂation rate under the
NA strategy than under the EA procedure.
• On the other hand, it acts also in an additive way, through the diﬀerence






which is positive. This component is directly related to the additional
variability which is introduced in the economy when transmission uncer-
tainty surrounds the use of the inﬂation rate as a stabilisation device.
The aggregation rule deadens the impact of this instrumental variability
on welfare in the case of the NA strategy relative to the EA procedure.
These two eﬀects increase the loss from using euro aggregation relative to
the loss from using national aggregation. From the foregoing, we conclude that
transmission uncertainty reinforces the result that in the presence of asymme-
tries in the transmission process the monetary authorities should use a national
aggregation procedure rather than follow a euro aggregation strategy.
4 Additive uncertainty and information sharing
in a heterogenous monetary union
In the foregoing, we have shown that transmission parameter uncertainty does
not change the ranking of the optimal federal monetary policy in the presence
of asymmetries. Rather it reinforces the need to base the monetary strategy on
national variables.
In this section, we analyse the case of uncertainty which is not of the mul-
tiplicative but of the additive type. We introduce additive uncertainty in the
model by assuming that the monetary authorities have an imperfect knowledge
about the common (symmetric) supply shock which hits the diﬀerent member
economies10. We suppose that each of the strategies considered is associated
with a speciﬁc forecasting process. With respect to the assumptions made pre-
viously, the monetary decisions taken at the Union level are set either on the
basis of national variables (the NA strategy) or on the basis of of Union-wide
aggregates (the EA strategy). Accordingly, under the NA-strategy, the fore-
casts are supposed to be based on the national information sets whereas under
the (EA) procedure they are related to one Union-wide deﬁned information set
10Another way to take additive uncertainty into account would have consisted in considering
measurement errors on structural variables in the model (like the natural of unemployment
or the unemployment gap).
14which may or may not hinge on the national ones. Thus we have national based
forecasts on the one hand and one direct, Union-wide forecast on the other hand.
Finally, we suppose that the forecast made by the Central Bank is private
information under both strategies, ie. it is not revealed to the private sec-
tor before the formation of its expectations to be embedded into the nominal
wage contracts. According to the classiﬁcation used by Cukierman (2000), the
monetary regime is one of limited transparency where the monetary authorities
possess imperfect forecasts of the shock.
4.1 The role of national forecasts in the national aggrega-
tion strategy
Consider ﬁrst the national aggregation strategy: we suppose that prior to the
occurrence of the shock but before the decision setting stage, each of the national







i is the forecast implemented by the monetary authority of country
i and νNA
i is the associated forecast (or measurement) error. The previous
decomposition reﬂects the presence of additive uncertainty in the model: the
Central Bank cannot observe the shock on the basis of which the monetary






We further suppose that the forecast is rationally formed with respect to
the relevant (national) information set (noted IfNA













=0 . It follows that fNA
i and νNA
i are not







The statistical properties of the measurement error can be both expressed in
terms of its unconditional and conditional (forecast-based) distribution. Given
the no correlation assumption between fNA
i and νNA
i and the fact that we
assume that fNA













































11In what follows, we will assume that the underlying distribution of all the random variables
is of the Normal type.
12This reﬂects the assumption according to which the national central Bank does not make
a systematic forecast error when predicting over the size of the shock.
15Given that the supply shock is not observed but only forecasted we specify
the loss function under the (NA) strategy as the weighted average of the expected
national losses. The latter are computed conditionally on the national central












The federal monetary authority then solves the following program:
πNA







i − ai · (π − πe,)+ε, for i =1 ,2,...,N














E is computed as the weighted average of national forecasts and







The result just derived (equation (11)) requires two assumptions:




and the transmission parameters of monetary policy (ai)i sz e r o .G i v e n
that the shocks, and thus the forecasts themselves have an expected value of
zero, there is little reason to expect that there is any relation between economic
disturbances (either fully or imperfectly forecasted) and monetary policy13.
2- Second, when the private sector forms its expectation of the inﬂation rate,
it does not know the value of fNA
i , nor that of the measurement error, which
are private information. (and, as we have implicitly assumed so far, it cannot
13In the ﬁrst order condition of the program it is thus possible to replace the expression Ã
N P
1
µi · ai · fNA
i
!
by aE · fNA
E under the assumption that the correlation term between the
ai and the fi is zero, that is:
PN







16observe the realisation of the shock ε either). In such a context, the value of
the inﬂation rate which is rationally expected by the private sector is zero.
Thus from (11) it follows that the optimal monetary policy (given by the
coeﬃcient ΩNA) is identical to the case of no uncertainty about the common
supply shock. The only diﬀerence is that in the uncertainty case the central
bank reacts to the forecast of the shock, while in the certainty case it reacts to
the realisation of the shock.
The solution is thus in line with the certainty equivalence principle with the
proviso that the variable about which uncertainty exists, has been replaced by
its certain equivalent (whose role is played by the forecast). This contrasts with
the result we obtained when the uncertainty is multiplicative and involves the
transmission process (see the previous section).
The welfare benchmark is given by the unconditional expectation of the
weighted average of the national losses. Thus we retain the following expression








where the expectation operator Eunc [.] applies for the (unconditional) dis-
tribution of ε,f NA
i and νi.
At this stage it is necessary to assess the statistical properties of the average
forecast fNA























The last equality prevails if we assume that the forecasts are performed







for i 6= j. The stringency of this assumption will be discussed later when we
examine the relationship between the Union-wide and average forecasts.
After having substituted the relevant values of the inﬂation and unemploy-
ment rates in (12), we ﬁnd:
14In a related way, we could also deﬁne a average measurement error, νNA
E such that ε =
fNA
E + νNA


















It is important to note however that νNA
E and fNA

























E + b · σ2


















E + b · σ2
ε − 2 · b · ΩNA· aE · σ2
fNA
E





i,a n d0<x≤ 1.












aﬀect the value of social welfare under the NA strategy.
Over and above those two elements, we also note the role played by the






f−, whose impact positively impinges on the choice of the NA
strategy by reducing the welfare loss (see the last term of equation (13)). This
lessening eﬀect is proper to the NA strategy insofar as the weighting average of
the national losses implies, as a byproduct, that the monetary policy decisions
are relying on the average forecast.
4.2 Euro-aggregation and the computation of a union-
wide forecast
Under the euro-aggregation procedure, the federal Central Bank elaborates its
own aggregate forecast of the common supply shock by adopting a (direct)
Union-wide perspective. Later we examine the possible links with the national-
based forecasting procedure related to the NA strategy.
Similarly to the foregoing, we deﬁne fEA
E as the rational (unbiased) forecast
implemented by the Central Bank on the basis of one Union-wide aggregate












The related measurement error is νEA






























































In line with the assumptions made previously about the EA strategy, the
federal central Bank minimises the expected value of the aggregate loss function
18which is computed conditionally on the relevant information set. Thus, the





with respect to π and taking as
given the aggregate Union-wide Phillips “curve” and the level of private sector’s
inﬂation expectations.
The optimal inﬂation rate obtained from this minimisation procedure has
t h es a m ef e a t u r e sa st h eo n ed e r i v e di nt h ec a s ew h e r et h es u p p l ys h o c ki s
observed with certainty, except for the fact that, under the present scenario,








= ΩEA · fEA
E
Finally, substituting for the (equilibrium) national unemployment rates and









E + b · σ2










Again we observe that the value of the loss function depends on the trans-
mission asymmetry and the union-wide forecast accuracy.
When we compare both strategies, we note that the relative variability of
the inﬂation rates depends on the relative properties of the forecasts, no matter
the problem of heterogeneity (see equations (11) and (14)).
This means, in turn, that the volatility of the national unemployment rate
is also contingent upon the relative accuracy of the forecasts of the supply dis-
turbance as the equilibirum level of the unemployment gap depends on the
stabilisation performance provided by the monetary authority (through the ma-
nipulation of the inﬂation rate). This can be seen from the following expressions
of the equilibrium national unemployment rates (obtained by substituting the
optimal inﬂation rates in the Phillips curve):
UNA
i = U∗
i − ai · ΩNA· fNA
E + ε (16)
UEA
i = U∗
i − ai · ΩEA · fEA
E + ε (17)
194.3 Forecast accuracy versus transmission heterogeneity:
characterising the trade-oﬀ
The overall comparison of the two strategies under additive uncertainty has
to be made with respect to the benchmark welfare function. Making use of






















E − (ΩNA) · σ2
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´
which can be rewritten as follows:
WEA
f − WNA










+b · aE · ΩNA· σ2
fNA
E +2· b · aE · ΩNA· (1 − x) · σ2
f
As expected, the sign of the diﬀerential loss function is ambiguous because
several factors play a role in the setting of optimal monetary policies and may
operate in diﬀerent directions.
1. The ﬁrst element (appearing through the comparison between ΩEA and
ΩNA) relates to the presence of asymmetries in the transmission pro-
cess. Ceteris paribus,w eh a v es h o w nt h a tt h eN As t r a t e g yp r o v i d e d
the best way (in terms of welfare) to tackle the prevailing heterogeneity
(ΩEA − ΩNA > 1).
2. The second factor refers to the quality of the forecasts associated to each
of the strategies considered. This problem enters the diﬀerential loss via






which can be considered as an
indication of the relative accuracy of the union-wide forecast versus the
average one.
3. The third element to take into account relates to the smoothed variability
of the average forecast (with respect to the common variance of the na-
tional ones). As previously mentionned, this component is proper to the
NA strategy and favors the choice of the former, no matter the two other
elements.
All in all, the choice between the two strategies depends on the relative
strength of the asymmetry and the forecast accuracy eﬀects. To investigate
how the trade-oﬀ performs between these two components, we denote by φ the
20coeﬃcient reﬂecting the relative accuracy of the union-wide forecast with respect










.W h e nφ > 1, the forecast based
on the area-wide information set has a more predictive power than the averaging
of the national forecasts.
We may thus rewrite the diﬀerential loss function as:
WEA
f − WNA
























































≶ φ. The following results obtain (see Annex C):
1. If the dispersion in the transmission parameters is large, the NA procedure
is always associated with a lower social loss than the EA strategy, whatever
the value of φ.
2. If the asymetry is of a small extent, there is a range over the values taken
by φ for which the choice of the EA procedure enhances welfare (with
respect to the NA strategy). In those circumstances, φ is always more
than one.
To illustrate further how the trade-oﬀ operates, it may be useful to anal-
yse separetely the role played by the forecast accurracy and the transmission
asymmetry on the sign of the diﬀerential loss. To this aim, two polar cases are
considered, one where no asymmetry prevails between the countries (so that the
choice will depend on the relative accuracy of the forecasts) and one where the
forecasts have the same (statistical) properties so that the sign of the welfare
diﬀerential loss will essentially depend on the stance of the dispersion between
the national transmission processes.
1- Let suppose, ﬁrst, that there is no asymmetry between the countries.
It follows that θ2


















21The relative gain in terms of welfare that the EA strategy provides over the
NA procedure is clearly contingent upon the quality of the forecasting procedure
to which it is related. The more accurate the union-wide forecast is15,t h el e s s
costly is the choice of the EA strategy.
Note however, that, even if the volatility of the forecasts were the same






), it would be beneﬁcial to use the
NA procedure. This could be explained by the fact that this strategy implies,
as a byproduct of the aggregation rule, a lessening in the aggregate volatility






, what is positively valued in terms of
welfare (compared to the volatility of one direct union-wide forecast under the
EA strategy).
2- Alternatively, we have to consider the case of a monetary union with
















. Then, the diﬀerential loss becomes:
WEA
f − WNA




+2 · b · aE · ΩNA· (1 − x) · σ2
f
The ﬁrst term is equivalent to the one prevailing under the case with no




ε i nt h ee x p r e s s i o n ) .W en o t et h a t
there is a positive relationship between the the size of the dispersion coeﬃcient
and the need for a national agregation-based strategy16.
The second term reﬂects the additional advantage related to the choice of
the NA procedure (cum forecasting) that we have already mentionned: there
is a smoothing in the variability associated to the use of the forecast when we
agregate the national losses under the NA strategy, no matter the presence or
the absence of dispersion.
At this stage, we may conclude that the national aggregation procedure has
to be chosen because it is a better way to deal with the asymmetry in the
transmission. But, on the other hand, such a strategy could be associated with
a relatively poor forecast which would aﬀect the stabilisation properties of the
monetary policy so as to render the EA strategy more attractive, especially
if the dispersion is of small amplitude. In other words to the extent that the
forecast errors related to the euro-aggregation procedure are smaller than the
15Here, we have in mind that the accuracy of the forecast (which is a random variable)
can be appreciated through the share that the forecast variance takes in the variance of the
underlying disturbance, ε.
16given that ΩEA > ΩNA
22aggregation of the forecast errors which is implicit in the national aggregation
strategy, and that the asymmetry in the transmission is not too important, the
beneﬁt obtained from using national data in the monetary policy decisions may
disappear.
This issue has been adressed in some empirical studies (see, e.g.,M a s s i -
miliano et alii (2003) and Fabiani and Morgan (2003)) which have compared
the predictive power of two forecasting methods for EMU variables. Two ways
for obtaining Euro-aggregate forecasts are generally considered either through
the “pooling country-speciﬁc forecasts” or “by directly forecasting the aggregate
variables using other aggregate variables”. In the case where the forecasts are
pooled, the pooling has to be understood as the weighted average of the individ-
ual country-speciﬁc forecasts (GDP weights). In general this “pooling” method
obtains better results in terms of forecast accuracy than one direct Union-wide
forecasting.
According to our theoretical framework, this result would imply that the
choice of the national aggregation strategy would be unambiguously better in
terms of welfare than adopting the euro-aggregation procedure. The argument
runs as follows.
First, a correspondence may be established beween the NA strategy and
the pooling method on the one hand and the EA procedure and the “direct
aggregate forecasting method” on the second hand (what we have called, in the
model, the computation of a union-wide forecast). This link is explicit when
w eo b s e r v eh o wt h eo p t i m a li n ﬂation rate expressions are deﬁned under the two
strategies: πNA depends on fNA
E which is the weighted average of the national
forecasts (one speciﬁc pooling method) whereas πEA depends on fEA
E which is
the union-wide forecast.
Given this correspondence, the empirical evidence suggests to examine in
t h em o d e lt h ec a s ew h e r et h er e l a t i v ea c c u r a c yo ft h eu n i o n - w i d ef o r e c a s ti sl e s s
than one, φ < 1. According to the results derived from the model (see supra
and Annex C), the federal central bank would gain in this case to implement a
national aggregation procedure, whatever the extent of the degree of asymmetry
prevailing between the national transmission mechanisms17.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The design of monetary policies in a monetary union is particularly challeng-
ing. One such challenge arises from the fact that the member countries have
17The case for the national aggregation procedure is all the more favored as a better relative
accuracy of the federal forecast is not a suﬃcient condition to adopt the euro-aggregation
procedure.
23maintained many of their idiosyncrasies. These have the eﬀect of creating asym-
metries in the transmission of common shocks. In this paper we conﬁrmed that
when asymmetries in the transmission exist, the common central bank can im-
prove the quality of monetary policy making by using national information
about inﬂation and the output gap, instead of focusing only on the union-wide
aggregates.
The main contribution of this paper consists in analysing whether this con-
clusion holds when uncertainty (of the additive or of the multiplicative type)
surrounds the design of monetary policy. We found that usually the presence
of uncertainty reinforces the need to use national data on inﬂation and output
gaps. The insistence of the ECB to use only union-wide aggregated information
about these variables is therefore likely to be suboptimal.
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7A n n e x e s
7.1 Annex A: loss comparison in the absence of uncer-
tainty
As seen p.8, the comparison of the losses favors the choice of a national aggre-
gation perspective with respect to one relying on a Union-wide strategy (see
equation (8)). This result comes from two eﬀects appearing in equation (6) and
which may play in opposite directions:
• First, the euro-aggregation strategy implies a higher volatility in the in-
ﬂation rate (ΩEA ≥ ΩNA). Indeed, under this strategy, the Central Bank
does not take the heterogenous structures of national transmission mecha-
nisms in the Union into account which would otherwise play as an incentive
to lessen the sensitivity of the optimal inﬂation rate to the supply shock.
This result obtains whether or not the weight on output stabilisation in





(1 − ΩEA · ai)




can be positive or negative. It can be shown (see infra)t h a t ,i nt h ec a s e





is large enough and the
output weight (b) in the loss function not too small, this term is positive.
In that case the national aggregation procedure contributes to reduce the
unemployment variability relative to the euro-aggregation strategy18.
To go further on the last result, let deﬁne the diﬀerential welfare loss from
the viewpoint of unemployment variability associated with a Union-wide aggre-







(1 − ΩEA · ai)
2 − (1 − ΩNA· ai)
2
i!
18In that case, the two eﬀects play in the same direction which favors the national aggre-
gation procedure





E · (ΩEA + ΩNA)
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is positive, this second order



















Thus, P (b) will be positive if and only if b ∈ [0 ; ∆1]a sb can only take
positive values.




















By the way, for θ2
aE and a2















































hyperbolic, monotonically decreasing function of θ2
aE.
dispersion coefficient
Thus, for small values of θ2
aE, P (b) will be positive whatever the value of b.
In this case, the (EA) strategy has to be favored. In the opposite case, when
θ2
aE takes relatively large values, the interval on which P (b) will be positive is
of small magnitude. It is then possible that for relatively large values of b,t h e
(NA) strategy delivers a smaller (aggregate) volatility of unemployment than
the (EA) procedure.
7.2 Annex B: correlated Phillips curve slopes
Suppose that the distribution of the e ai has the following properties:
Ea (e ai)=ai, ∀i =1 ,...,N
cova (e ai,e aj)=
½
ρij if i 6= j
σ2
a if i = j i,j =1 ,...,N















The results obtained in the paper would be modiﬁed (qualitatively) by these
new assumptions if σ∗2
aE > σ2
a.B u t ,a sw ew i l ls e e ,t h i si sn o tt h ec a s e .
27Proof: let rewrite ρij in terms of the correlation coeﬃcient rij: ρij =
rij.
p
var(e ai).var(e aj), that is, ρij = rij · σ2
a. Moreover, we know that:






























7.3 Annex C: forecast accuracy and transmission asym-
metry
We consider how forecast accuracy (measured by the coeﬃcient φ)a n dd i s p e r -
sion (measured by θ2
aE)a ﬀect the diﬀerential welfare loss between the national







function of φ and θ2




















































































is positive or negative. Note that only strictly positive values for φ have to
be considered. By the way, in analysing this relationship, we take θ2
aE as the















































aE. Then, the diﬀerential loss is a monotonically






> 0, ∀φ ∈ R∗
+.
2. θ2
aE < g θ2
aE. Then, the diﬀerential loss is a monotonically decreas-
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.A s φ∗ (0) > 1( f o rx 6= 1), we conclude that






. This means that for the euro-agregation strategy
to be welfare-improving (with respect to the national agregation procedure),
the union-wide forecast has to be more accurate than the average one (where
accuracy is deﬁned in terms of variance).
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